Moses Shepard
3926 North 13th
Place
Phoenix,
Arizona
602-222-6679
OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
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IN THE MATTER OF: PETITION TO AMEND Rule 31, Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court and TO ADD Rule 32 and Rules 76 through 80, Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court |
Case No. R-02-0017, R-02-0027, CV-02-0121-PR MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR LACK OF IMPARTIALITY UNDER JUDICIAL ETHICS RULE 81, CANONS 1-5, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, RULES |
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And Related PETITION FOR SPECIAL ACTION against the STATE BAR OF ARIZONA |
OF THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT, AND, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR FULL DISCLOSURE, |
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And Related PETITION TO REPEAL
Rules 31 – 74 of the Arizona Rules of
the Supreme Court |
REQUEST FOR PUBLIC HEARING, AND MOTION TO STAY ANY FINAL ORDER OR MANDATE REGARDING THE |
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And Related MOTION TO STRIKE OR
DISMISS the State Bar’s Petition to Amend or Add New Rules |
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW [SIC] ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED |
COMES NOW the people of
Arizona (hereinafter
"Petitioners"), by and through ex relatione non-bar member Moses
Shepard, (hereinafter "Relator"), to move each one of the Arizona
Supreme Court’s (the State Bar) judges to recuse him or herself from making any
decision or taking any action with regards to the State Bar of Arizona’s
above-entitled petition[1]
pursuant to the Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court, Code of Judicial Conduct,
Judicial Ethics Rule 81, Canons 1-5, because each one of this Court’s (the
State Bar) judges are also members of the State Bar, i.e., you are all,
effectively, one and the same. Bar
members, i.e., this Court, are moved to recuse themselves because they are
automatically disqualified from hearing the State Bar’s own cause by reason of
interest or prejudice. General
principles of law and reason dictate that a group of non-bar members should act
in their place, one composed of individuals that have never graduated from, nor
attended, any law school approved by any mandatory bar anywhere in the
world. Furthermore, that group should
be composed of individuals that are acceptable to all parties concerned. If this Court (the Bar) does not
recuse itself or acts in secret with no public hearing, its integrity and
independence will be called into question under Judicial Canon 1, it will not
avoid the appearance of impropriety under Canon 2, it will not be acting
impartially under Canon 3, it will be engaged in extra-judicial activities in
conflict with its judicial obligations casting reasonable doubt on each judge’s
capacity to act impartially as a judge under Canon 4, and it will be engaged in
inappropriate political activity under Canon 5 by siding with itself. See Black’s Law Dictionary as to “political
questions,” “justiciable controversies,” “political,” and all related
authorities.
In the alternative, if this Court, i.e., the State Bar’s own judges will not disqualify themselves or dismiss their own petition for lack of any hard evidence proving any harm caused by UPL [sic], then a request for a public hearing is hereby made pursuant to Rule 28(E), Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court, in addition to a prior full disclosure of each one of this Court’s judges’ interest tied up with bar membership, whether that interest be financial, personal, or otherwise. This Court is further moved to order each one of the real parties in interest[2] disclosed by its own July 17, 2002 Order to disclose their interest as well, i.e., those listed on pages 2-4 under the title “Rule 28 Distribution Comment List.”
In
the event that this Court (the State Bar) disqualifies itself until such time
that neutral decision makers can be found, the petitioners would also
ask this Court (the State Bar) to state exactly how many signatures[3]
it needs to be convinced that it is the will of the people to be set free to
choose who will practice law on their behalf, whether that individual be a
member of the State Bar, or not. We are
confident that, if a stay of proceedings is granted, we would have no trouble
collecting more than that number of signatures, unless, of course, no
amount of signatures will ever dissolve the State Bar.
If this Court refuses to voluntarily
recuse themselves, then it is asked to state whether or not this moots
their own rules or just the necessity of having those rules. In other words, what is the point of having rules
when those very rules may be ignored at the whim of those to whom the rules are
supposed to apply? Also, if the five
lawyers presently doing business as the “supreme court” don’t have to follow
their own ethical rules, or any rules for that matter, merely by suspending
them, then why should anyone else have to follow them? Are these lawyers
anarchists who don’t believe in being bound by rules?[4]
“The
Arizona Court of Appeals recognized, ‘the bias and prejudice necessary to
disqualify a judge must arise from an extra-judicial source and not from what
the judge has done in his participation in the case. U.S. v Grinnel Corp. 384 U.S. 563 … (1966).’” Smith v. Smith 115 Ariz. 299, 303 564
P.2d 1266 (App.1977). Does this Court
(the State Bar) consider the State Bar to be extra-judicial?
A.R.S.
38-503(B) states, “Conflict of interest.
Any public officer or employee who has, or whose relative has, a
substantial interest in any decision of a public agency shall make known such
interest in the official records of such public agency and shall refrain from
participating in any manner as an officer or employee in such decision.” Does this Court (the State Bar) see any
conflict of interest?
Judicial
Cannon 3E(1) states: "E. Disqualification. (1) A judge shall disqualify
himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned ... " [emphasis added].
If this Court (the State Bar) intends to modify the rules
per the State Bar’s (its own) petition, it is asked to stay any order or
mandate pending an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. The claim for such an appeal would be that Arizona judge bar
membership violates Cannon 2C[5]
and is, consequently, contrary to the Arizona Constitution’s right-to-work
clause and the U.S. Constitution’s equal protection clauses.[6]
The
above entitled motions are more fully supported by the above entitled documents
previously filed with the Supreme Court of Arizona, each one of which is hereby
incorporated herein by reference.
In
considering this motion, this Court is asked to carefully consider our past,
and our future:
"Apartheid exists
when rights are based on group identity, favoring one group at the expense of
another." – Christopher Lingle
"There is no crueler tyranny
than that which is exercised under cover of law, and with the colors of justice
…" – U.S. vs. Jannottie, 673 F.2d 578, 614 (3d Cir. 1982)
“Unlimited power is apt to corrupt the minds of those
who possess it; and this I know, my lords, that where law ends, tyranny
begins.” – Lord Chatham (William Pitt) to the British House of Lords in January
1770, from which the quotation on the front of the Arizona State Courts
Building is derived, “Where law ends, tyranny begins.”
Respectfully
submitted this 19th day of August, 2002.
_______________________________
Moses Shepard
3926 North 13 Place
Phoenix,
Arizona
Original and
six copies filed with the Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court on this 19th
day of August, 2002, and a copy mailed, telefaxed or hand-delivered to:
Bob Banwyck,
Assistant Executive Director – Legal
State Bar of
Arizona
111 West
Monroe, Suite 1800
Phoenix,
Arizona 85003
By: ___________________________
[1] And or the Relator’s Petition for Special Action against the State Bar of Arizona filed on 7/9/02 under Case No. R-02-0017.
[2] All those effected by this Court’s, i.e., the State Bar’s, expansion and enforcement of its monopoly over the practice of law.
[3] Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 are additional petitions and affidavits overriding the State Bar’s pretext of “harm” due to UPL.
[4] This paragraph was not added out of any unconscious disrespect, but, on the suggestion of one who pointed out that the same arguments made against disbanding bars can also be used to argue against an unaccountable out-of-control judiciary.
[5] See Commentary for Cannon 2C as to organizations whose membership limitations could not be constitutionally prohibited.
[6] Not the least of which includes employment discrimination based on membership in intimate, purely private organizations.