3926 North 13 Place
IN THE MATTER OF:
PETITION TO AMEND Rule 31,
Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court and
TO ADD Rule 32 and Rules 76 through 80, Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court.
Supreme Court No. R-02-0017
MOTION TO STRIKE THE BAR’S PETITION
TO AMEND RULE 31, ARIZONA RULES OF
THE SUPREME COURT AND TO ADD RULE 32 AND RULES 76 THROUGH 80, ARIZONA RULES
PETITION TO REPEAL Rules 31 – 74,
Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court
AND MOTION TO SUSPEND THE RULES.
OF THE SUPREME COURT, ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION TO DISMISS THE BAR’S PETITION DUE TO IMPROPER VENUE AND FAILURE TO JOIN AN INDISPENSIBLE PARTY UNDER RULE 19
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
Comes now the people of Arizona, those most effected by the bar’s Petition to Amend Rule 31, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., and to Add Rules 32 and Rules 76 through 80, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.., pertaining to the unauthorized practice of law, (hereinafter "Petitioners"), by and through ex relatione non-bar member Moses Shepard, (hereinafter "Relator"), to move this Court to strike the bar’s petition due to their failure to offer any evidence to support their claims. In the alternative, this Court is moved to dismiss the bar’s petition due to their failure to bring it into the proper venue, in addition to their failure to join the real parties in interest directly effected by their monopoly over the practice of law.
The bar’s petition should be stricken or “rejected for lack of need, merit, or substance” pursuant to Rule 28(a)(2), Ariz.R.Sup.Ct.. Here, “it cannot be disputed that even the most uninformed persons are well aware” what constitutes the practice of law, so, that which is obvious need not be clarified by bar members, for other bar members, in this case, Arizona’s judges, most of which are bar members.
This Court was not the proper venue for the bar to bring its petition because all of its judges are also bar members, so each one of them has an inherent conflict of interest. What the bar should have done was filed a motion to suspend the rules so men and woman acceptable to both sides, but a member of neither, could make this decision. Therefore, your acceptance of the bar’s petition was factually inconsistent with your oath of office to avoid decisions which bring about a conflict of interest.
The men and women that should have been joined as parties to the bar’s petition are those who stand to lose money if the bar is dissolved, as it should be, simply by following the bar’s own logic, i.e., because the number of annual complaints about bar members far exceeds that which they claim exists against non-bar members, the actual existence of the bar does little, or nothing, to stop all those complaints against bar members from pouring in year after year. Also, in all likelihood, if scholarly research already done on UPL is any indication, if alleged complaints against “UPL-ers” even exists, then most were filed by bar members and not the individuals that were allegedly harmed. It is also common knowledge that those who file complaints against bar members get little satisfaction from the bar after doing so, which is not surprising, because it is bar members that consider those complaints.
If the bar were dissolved, many prospective practitioners might choose not to go to a three year law school because they would no longer have to in order to become members of any bar. Many might not even attend a four-year college in order to save themselves the added cost of doing that. The resulting drop in school enrollment would effect all related sectors of that monopoly, including, but not limited to, the schools themselves, their owners, and the bankers who lend the students their loans, etc.. Such are the real “parties in interest”  that profit directly off of the existence of “bars” around the world. Therefore, if this bar were to end, others around the world might end as well.
This document may be viewed as a product of the “unauthorized” practice of law because it was filed by a non-bar member on behalf of others, some of which are also non-bar members practicing law without your authorization to do so. As such, you are obliged to strike such documents because you refuse to acknowledge communication, no matter how factual or sound it may be, merely because I am not a member of your labor organization in your alleged right-to-work state, in this case, your bar. As a result, bar members may simply deride this document as “legally defective.” Therefore:
1. You can “strike” this document, but then I’m going to tell these people that you don’t wish to hear them because they can’t or don’t want to hire a bar member, the whole point of their response.
2. You can rule on this document by issuing your standard one word response, “denied,” but then I’m going to tell these people that you, once again, de facto authorized the unauthorized practice of law.
3. You could rule on this document by saying I have a “private interest” in this matter as one who says, as adults, we should be free to engage in mutual, voluntary, consensual, contractual relations, with other adults, whether those relations be business, personal, or religious in nature, including practicing law on behalf of others, without strangers (namely, yourselves) violently intruding and interfering.
4. You could write an opinion that addresses the people’s desire and need for freedom, but then you might be asked to state how I, a non-bar member, was able to represent them so well (their opinion).
5. You could act as though you never got this document by not responding to it but then you might have to state why your clerks accepted UPL, or even acknowledged it, by stamping it and noting it in your computers, websites, and docket entries lists.
6. You could modify the bar’s proposed rule changes in order to appease all that oppose them, as part of a public relations effort, but then I’m going to have to tell these people that you have still failed to address the underlying issue: While you agree that all non-bar members are not competent to represent themselves in matters legal, whether in or out of court, or to manage their own legal affairs (“only a fool has themself as their own lawyer”), the fact remains that litigants in “civil” cases are just as incompetent as alleged criminals. So, while you will pay for an alleged criminal’s lawyer, due to their obvious incompetence (however incompetent their paid bar member may be), you will nonetheless force civil litigants to act as their own lawyer, or lose their case, with the only alternative being that they must pay a bar member, and only a bar member, even if they can’t afford one and/or a non-bar member is willing to work for them for free. Even so, you still force them, under threat of a default judgment, to try and do competently that which you say only trained bar members know how to do. Effectively, you order them to do brain surgery on themselves, or pilot a jumbo jet.
So the choice is yours, you can either give your bar an even longer list of ways to use violence against others, and an even smaller list of options to those that are already being denied their freedom and crying out for deliverance, or you can demonstrate your infinite grace, benevolence, and wisdom, and let the people go. You see, we understand what is going on: You’re going to have to sacrifice either one of two things, either good faith (fairness, justice, etc.) or sacrifice your bar’s desire to use even more organized coercion and even more violence in order to achieve your aims. We understand that anyone that can simply suspend their own rules whenever they like, or fall back on a “rule of necessity,” is, ultimately, not following any rules because they can always defer to the same in order to achieve their aims whenever they like.
It is worth noting that the precedent has already been set. Judge Howe of the Superior Court of Maricopa County knew, or should have known that he was ruling on UPL documents which he chose not to strike. Judge Mangum, who followed him, also ruled on UPL documents. Even more telling, to this day, he has refused to strike one single UPL document. Similarly, the Court of Appeals ruled on UPL documents, and so did you. I am therefore forced to conclude that the problem, if any, that many of you have with UPL is not the UPL itself but rather, who stands to profit off the same, i.e. the bar’s monopoly. That is consistent with your bar’s apparent fear of non-bar members out-performing them once their monopoly finally ends, a monopoly that is factually inconsistent with a true capitalist free market. How else can the people be heard if they don’t have a voice, or the money to pay for one, one that knows the rules of court and is willing to fight even for free, if necessary? How else can one win in the face of overwhelming odds? The answer is to stand firm and simply respond with one word. No.
Respectfully submitted this 31th day of July, 2002.
Moses Shepard ex relatione
attorney for the respondents
3926 North 13 Place
Original and six copies filed with the Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court on this 31th day of July, 2002, and a copy mailed, telefaxed or hand-delivered to:
Allen B. Shayo, Assistant Executive Director – Legal
State Bar of Arizona
111 West Monroe, Suite 1800
Phoenix, Arizona 85003
 See Rule 11, Ariz.R.Civ.P., requiring good faith arguments based upon well established facts and not mere supposition.
 See Rule 12(b)(3), Ariz.R.Civ.P., requiring petitions than cannot be easily dismissed for one reason or another.
 See Rule 19, Ariz.R.Civ.P., regarding real parties in interest being present, so that a controversy can be properly settled.
 See Hackin v. State of Arizona, 102 Ariz. 218, 221 (1967): “It cannot be disputed that one who represents another in court, be he indigent or not, is, under our adversary process, going to the very core of the practice of law, a fact with which even the most uninformed persons are well aware.”
 And, of course, all of the bar members that petitioned this Court are very familiar with Hackin v. State, and, even if they are not, they needn’t be, because “even the most uninformed persons are well aware” what constitutes the practice of law.
 See Code of Judicial Conduct, Rules 81-82, Canons 1-5, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., especially Canon 3E(1)-(2), Disqualification. Note: If you agree that the rule of disqualification applies due to your obvious lack of neutrality as members of the bar, you cannot defer to the rule of necessity in this case because you can quite easily find non-bar members accepted to both sides that can decide this case. See Rule 81, Commentary on Cannon 3E(1), Ariz.R.Sup.Ct.. Of course, even that is unnecessary because the bar offers no evidence at all, while we do, so their petition should be summarily rejected anyway.
 A full disclosure of each judges’ interest, whether financial, personal, or otherwise could reveal that they are the real parties.
 See U.S. v. Stepard, 876 F.Supp. 214 (D. Ariz. 1992).
 For financial reasons.
 As a “real party in interest.” See “ex relatione” as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary in any pertinent edition.
 Just as the Court of Appeals did in Encinas v. Mangum, 365 Ariz.Adv.Rep. 39 (2002), by never ruling on a Motion for Interlocutory Order and, yet again, on a separate Motion for Clarification and Judicial Notice. See internet address http://www.cofad1.state.az.us/casefiles/SA010247.TXT.
 “The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to represent him. A defendant's need for a lawyer is nowhere better stated than in the moving words of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68, (1932): 'The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.' 287 U.S., at 68-9.” Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
 The American Bar Association has been pushing for years for a moratorium on the death penalty because of their belief that many innocent people are being put to death by the states because of ineffective (incompetent) counsel (their lawyers).
 Provided, of course, their piloting of a jumbo jet is permitted if, and only if, they do it alone, and not on behalf of others.
 Because, it cannot be disputed that even the most uninformed persons are well aware what constitutes the practice of law.
 Judge J. Kenneth Mangum even refused to strike all of my UPL documents after I filed a motion asking him to do it.
 The Court of Appeals, Division One, also refused to strike all of my UPL documents when I moved them to do so as well. Apparently, I can produce all the UPL documents I want, and the opposition can “assist” that UPL as much as they want.
 Arizona Supreme Court No. CV-02-0121-PR; Court of Appeals No. 1 CA-SA 01-0247; Superior Court No. CV99-18701; even the opposition failed to move to strike until the very last moment to avoid having their UPL-assisting history exposed.
 Under Rule 28, RASC, I now submit hundreds of signatures, petitions, and affidavits opposing a mandatory bar, attached hereto as Exhibit 1. In the interests of judicial economy I am submitting them as one document on behalf of others. Nota bene: By “attorney for respondents” I do not mean public attorney, i.e., lawyer (bar member). I mean private attorney, i.e., agent or representative acting on behalf of others. Please see Black’s Law Dictionary and/or the preamble for Rule 42, RASC, for the clarification of these terms, as defined by bar members. In the alternative, I submit Exhibit “1” ex relatione.